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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1858, Pope Pius IX ordered the abduction of a six-year-old Jewish 
boy, Edgardo Mortara, from his family’s residence in Bologna.  Mortara
had been secretly baptized some years earlier by a Catholic housemaid. 
When authorities with the Inquisition learned that a baptized child was 
being raised in a Jewish household, they had him forcibly separated from 
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his parents and taken to the Vatican, where he was raised under the pope’s 
personal supervision. Despite desperate pleas from the Mortara family, 
along with widespread international protest, Pius IX refused to return the 
boy to his parents. The pope defended his decision on the grounds that canon 
law and the civil law of the Papal States required providing a baptized
child with a Catholic upbringing, which Mortara would not have received
from his Jewish family.1 
For many Catholics, the case of Edgardo Mortara remains a source of
shame and moral regret for the Church.2 Catholic scholars have criticized
Pius IX’s decision for violating natural law, for abusing his civil authority
as the head of the Papal States, and for acting on the basis of anti-Semitic 
prejudice.3  Recently, however, some Catholic traditionalists have defended 
Pius IX’s decision as required under canon law and civil law.  In a controversial 
review of Mortara’s memoirs, a Dominican priest and professor of theology,
Romanus Cessario, wrote that the civil law upheld by Pius IX “was not
unreasonable” and suggested that civil liberties, such as those that might
have been asserted on behalf of Mortara’s family, cannot “trump the
requirements of faith.”4 
1. The facts recounted in the paragraph above have been described by many historians.
See generally DAVID I. KERTZER, THE KIDNAPPING OF EDGARDO MORTARA (1997); ELÈNA 
MORTARA, WRITING FOR JUSTICE: VICTOR SÉJOUR, THE KIDNAPPING OF EDGARDO MORTARA, 
AND THE AGE OF TRANSATLANTIC EMANCIPATIONS (2015); Steven Lubet, Judicial Kidnapping, 
Then and Now: The Case of Edgardo Mortara, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 961 (1999) (book review). 
2. See Anna Momigliano, Why Some Catholics Defend the Kidnapping of a Jewish
Boy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/ 
01/some-catholics-are-defending-the-kidnapping-of-a-jewish-boy/551240 [https://perma.cc/
LM2K-DR7V] (“Today, the dominant Catholic attitude toward the Mortara case is one of
regret . . . .”). 
3. See Kevin J. Madigan, We Cannot Accept This: A Response to Romanus Cessario’s 
‘Non Possumus,’ COMMONWEAL (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/ 
we-cannot-accept [https://perma.cc/VW5U-H6XS] (“That Pius IX chose to educate a Jew, 
and not an uncatechized baptized Catholic (of whom there were hundreds of thousands in 
Italy alone), practically proves that the pope was motivated by anti-Semitic feeling . . . .”);
Robert T. Miller, The Mortara Case and the Limits of State Power: First Things Should
Disavow Fr. Cessario’s Defense of Pius IX in the Mortara Case, PUB. DISCOURSE (Jan.
11, 2018), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/01/20868 [https://perma.cc/4ZEQ-
5FZ3] (describing Pius IX’s decision as an “outrageous abuse of state power”); Michael 
Sean Winters, Fr. Cessario’s Edgardo Mortara Essay Is Inexcusable, NAT’L CATH. REP. 
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/distinctly-catholic/fr-cessarios-
edgardo-mortara-essay-inexcusable [https://perma.cc/ML5Q-XJMH] (“Only a failure to
recognize the human dignity of our Jewish brothers and sisters can account for the crime 
then, or for . . . attempts to excuse it now.”). 
 4. Romanus Cessario, Non Possumus, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2018), https://www.firstthings. 
com/article/2018/02/non-possumus [https://perma.cc/e25g-bbf7]; see also Frater Asinus,
Debemus: In Defense of Fr. Cessario, Bl. Pius IX, and the Catholic Faith, JOSIAS (Feb. 7,
2018), https://thejosias.com/2018/02/07/debemus-in-defense-of-fr-cessario-bl-pius-ix-and-
the-catholic-faith [https://perma.cc/GSL5-3Q9W]; P.J. Smith, On the Value of the Mortara
1040
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This defense of Pius IX is part of a revival of Catholic integralism that 
has occurred in the last several years,5 leading to sharp debates among 
religious conservatives about their participation in the project of liberal 
democracy.6 Integralists argue that liberalism is a relentless and destructive
ideology.7  They claim that the only way to remedy its many failures is to
recognize the authority of the Church and to transform the administrative 
state into one that promotes the common good as understood within Catholic 
doctrine.8  They favor a confessional state, in which civic ends are subordinated 
to supernatural ones, as guided by an established Catholic Church—or,
going even further, a social system in which church and state are so well
integrated that it no longer makes sense to distinguish between them.9 
These are radical views, and much of the response to them has focused 
on their plausibility as interpretations of Catholic doctrine10 and on their
Case, SEMIDUPLEX (Jan. 9, 2018), https://semiduplex.com/2018/01/09/on-the-value-of-
the-mortara-case [https://perma.cc/QNL4-YQ2V]; Adrian Vermeule, (@Vermeullarmine),
TWITTER (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:07 AM), https://mobile.twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/
951093226043269120 [https://perma.cc/6RJY-WGWK]  (“Pius IX’s actions were valid, so
[discussion] seems to be about whether to say so publicly.”). 
5. See, e.g., Thomas Pink, In Defence of Catholic Integralism, PUB. DISCOURSE
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/08/39362 [https://perma.cc/ 
Z59Q-LXD8]; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017), https:// 
www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy [https://perma.cc/25XA-YWWZ];
Edmund Waldstein, An Integralist Manifesto, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2017), https://www. 
firstthings.com/article/2017/10/an-integralist-manifesto [https://perma.cc/G3YC-NJVC].
6. See infra Section II.C.
 7. See Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017), https:// 
www.firstthings.com/article/2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism [https://perma.cc/WV6Z-4R92]; 
cf. PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018); RYSZARD LEGUTKO, THE DEMON 
IN DEMOCRACY: TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATIONS IN FREE SOCIETIES (Teresa Adelson trans.,
2016).
8. Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, AM. AFF. (Feb. 20, 2018), https:// 
americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/RHX2-9VGA]
(reviewing PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018)). 
9. See Edmund Waldstein, What Is Integralism Today?, CHURCH LIFE J. (Oct. 31,
2018), https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/what-is-integralism-today [https://perma.cc/
CWP9-AV32]  (“[Catholic integralists] wish to establish something more like . . . the baroque 
confessional state.  Or, perhaps even more radically, they wish to work towards something 
like High Medieval Christendom.  In that arrangement . . . it makes no sense to distinguish 
Church and state as separate spheres at all; rather there was one single kingdom in which 
spiritual and temporal authorities cooperated.”). 
10. See, e.g., Massimo Faggioli, A Church Within the Church: Behind the New
Integralism Is the Old Intransigentism, COMMONWEAL (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.common
wealmagazine.org/church-within-church [https://perma.cc/ABX7-TQJB]; R.J. Snell, Some
Catholic Thinkers Are Anti-liberal, but the Church Is Not, MOSAIC (Mar. 19, 2018), 
1041
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viability, or lack thereof, within the politics of Western liberal democracies.11 
To our knowledge, however, there has not been a considered response from 
within liberal political philosophy.  In the midst of emerging authoritarianism 
around the world, and with some illiberal politicians and philosophers
calling for ethnoreligious nationalist political programs, how should liberals
respond?  What should liberals say about the rise of religious antiliberalism 
in the form of Catholic integralism?12 
In this symposium contribution, we argue that Catholic integralism is 
unreasonable.  Our conception of reasonableness is defined in terms of
substantive moral and epistemic commitments to respecting the freedom
and equality of citizens who hold a wide—but not unlimited—range of
religious, ethical, and philosophical conceptions of the good.13  In arguing 
that Catholic integralism conflicts with this understanding of reasonableness, 
it might seem that we are begging the question against integralists.  But 
our purpose here is not to engage integralists on their own terms.  So far, 
the debate about integralism has been conducted mostly among Catholics 
and Christian conservatives.  Our critique is external to Catholicism and not 
intended to persuade integralists by offering them arguments from within 
their own religious views.  That might be a viable form of internal criticism, 
or “reasoning from conjecture,”14 which entails arguing from within others’
religious or philosophical doctrines to show that they have reasons to accept 
liberal principles.15  We leave that project to others.16 
https://mosaicmagazine.com/response/uncategorized/2018/03/some-catholics-are-anti-
liberal-but-the-church-is-not [https://perma.cc/K9N3-GM2U].
11. See, e.g., Rod Dreher, Integralism, Liberalism, or . . . What?, AM. CONSERVATIVE
(Jan. 11, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/integralism-
liberalism-or-what [https://perma.cc/2FTH-S559]; Stephanie Slade, The New Theocrats 
Are Neither Conservative Nor Christian, REASON (June 3, 2019, 3:15 PM), https://reason. 
com/2019/06/03/the-new-theocrats-are-neither-conservative-nor-christian [https://perma.cc/ 
3JV3-TNZX].
12.  One of us has addressed aspects of this question elsewhere.  See generally Richard 
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and the First Amendment, 103 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing the normative, legal, and political implications 
of religious antiliberalism in the context of American church-state jurisprudence). 
13. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 49–50 (expanded ed. 1993); see also
JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 36–39 (2011). 
14. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 783
(1997). 
15. See generally Micah Schwartzman, The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture, 
9 J. MORAL PHIL. 521 (2012).  For examples of reasoning from conjecture, see ANDREW 
MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
(2009); Robert S. Taylor, Religious Conservatives and Safe Sex: Reconciliation by Nonpublic 
Reason, 3 AM. POL. THOUGHT 322 (2014). 
16. It is an interesting question who, if anyone, should undertake such a project.  Compare
Matthew Clayton & David Stevens, When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism 
and Unreasonable Religions, 20 RES PUBLICA 65 (2014) (arguing for a justificatory division 
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Our purpose here is to explain the sense in which integralists are
unreasonable from a liberal perspective, which requires explicating and 
applying moral concepts that lie at the center of liberal political thought. 
Our conception of reasonableness is drawn from political liberalism,
which takes some fundamental ideas to be constitutive of political morality 
in liberal democratic societies.17  These include the ideas of society as a 
fair system of social cooperation in which citizens see each other as free 
and equal, and the idea of reasonable pluralism, which holds that in any
free society, citizens acting in good faith will affirm a wide range of 
comprehensive religious, ethical, and philosophical views.  A task of political 
and legal philosophy is to work out the implications of these ideas, which 
are implicit in our liberal democratic political culture.18  We try to do that
by rehearsing what we take to be the main ideas of Catholic integralism 
and by showing how they conflict with a conception of reasonableness 
that requires cooperating on fair terms, including by respecting the freedom 
and equality of citizens, regardless of whether they affirm a particular 
religious view.  We shall also return to the case of Mortara, which helps to 
clarify what is at stake in rejecting the moral values of such a conception. 
II. CATHOLICISM, INTEGRALISM, AND ANTILIBERALISM
To understand the contours of contemporary Catholic integralism, it is 
necessary to provide some background in earlier antiliberal thought.19  The
usual narrative here would take us back at least as far as the papal encyclicals 
of the nineteenth century,20 especially Pius IX’s Syllabus of Errors, which
denounced secularism, disestablishment of the Church, and free exercise 
of labor in which religious citizens are delegated the responsibility of engaging those 
within their faith tradition who hold otherwise unreasonable views), with Baldwin Wong,
Conjecture and the Division of Justificatory Labor: A Comment on Clayton and Stevens, 
25 RES PUBLICA 119 (2019) (arguing that politicians and philosophers are permitted and
perhaps required by a natural duty of justice to engage unreasonable citizens, even if they
do not share their religious perspectives). 
17. See infra Section III.A. 
18. See Burton Dreben, On Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS 316, 323 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
19. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM (1993). 
20. See Pink, supra note 5; Gabriel Sanchez, Catholic Integralism and the Social Kinship
of Christ, JOSIAS (Jan. 23, 2015), https://thejosias.com/2015/01/23/catholic-integralism-
and-the-social-kingship-of-christ [https://perma.cc/92PM-FAEZ].
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of religion, among other heresies of modernity.21  But instead, we begin 
with Carl Schmitt, whose writing on Catholicism and whose critique of liberal 
democracy have been influential in the resurgence of integralist thought, 
especially for Adrian Vermeule, who has played a prominent role in making 
integralism part of our public discourse.22 We then turn to contemporary
integralism, sketching some of its central claims and arguments. Lastly, 
we note the increasing prominence of Schmittian and integralist views in 
recent debates among American religious conservatives. 
A. The Political Idea of Catholicism 
Schmitt might seem to be an unlikely source of inspiration for integralists 
given his identification with the Nazi Party in the early 1930s.23  But 
Schmitt was raised as a Catholic,24 and before he became a Nazi, he wrote 
admiringly and with some insight about the Church.25  In an early work, 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt offered a political analysis 
of Catholicism and its antagonistic relationship with liberalism.26  Schmitt’s
argument ranges widely, but we focus on a few main ideas that have 
helped to shape current integralist thinking, especially when coupled with
Schmitt’s later and better known work in The Concept of the Political.27 
First, in Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt articulated
what he called “the political idea of Catholicism.”28  He noted that the Church
had been accused of political opportunism by aligning itself with all types 
21. Pope Bl. Pius IX, The Syllabus of Errors, PAPAL ENCYCLICALS ONLINE (Feb.
20, 2017), http://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius09/p9syll.htm [https://perma.cc/9DLD-
KRPJ].
22. See Vermeule, supra note 5 (turning to Schmitt’s work “for intellectual resources 
and political counsel”); Adrian Vermeule, The Ark of Tradition, U. BOOKMAN (Nov. 19, 
2017), https://kirkcenter.org/reviews/the-ark-of-tradition [https://perma.cc/HD6K-WW59]
(reviewing CARL SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM (G.L. Ulmen trans., 
1996)).
23. See Lars Vinx, Carl Schmitt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 1, 2014), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=schmitt [https://perma.cc/
XZ3M-G5E8].
24. See Reinhard Mehring, A “Catholic Layman of German Nationality and Citizenship”? 
Carl Schmitt and the Religiosity of Life, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL SCHMITT 73, 
77–78 (Jens Meierhenrich & Oliver Simons eds., 2016) (discussing Schmitt’s complicated 
relationship with Catholicism). 
25. See Jens Meierhenrich, Fearing the Disorder of Things: The Development of 
Carl Schmitt’s Institutional Theory, 1919–1942, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL SCHMITT, 
supra note 24, at 171, 191 (“Schmitt’s admiration for the institutionalism of the Catholic 
Church . . . knew few bounds at the time.”). 
26. See generally SCHMITT, supra note 22. 
27. CARL CHMITT HE ONCEPT OS , T C F THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., Univ. 
of Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932). 
28. SCHMITT, supra note 22, at 6. 
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of governments at different times and places.29  The Church could be found 
supporting monarchies, democracies, socialist regimes and liberal governments, 
nationalist coalitions, and states with universalist or imperial ambitions.30 
As Schmitt put it, “With every change in the political situation, all principles
appear to change save one: the power of Catholicism.”31 
Schmitt responded to this charge of opportunism by understanding the
Church as what he called “a complex of opposites, a complexio oppositorum.”32 
The Church can take different and competing, even contradictory, political 
forms. It has a great capacity for adaptability and accommodation, which 
allows the Church “to have united within itself all forms of state and
government.”33  But if the Church can contain contradictions in political 
form, there remained a question about whether the Church is purely 
opportunistic or has some deeper political essence. 
The answer Schmitt gave was that the Church is “eminently political” 
but not “in the sense of the manipulation and domination of fixed social 
and international power factors.”34  Schmitt distinguished the mechanisms
of political control, including economic and military power, from a concept 
of the political that is based on a claim of authority, which, in turn, is grounded 
in what he called “an ethos of belief.”35  The Church can provide such an ethos
because it represents “the Person of Christ Himself: God become man in 
historical reality.”36  Schmitt’s political idea of the Church was built on this
assumption that the Church is Christ’s representative and therefore imbued 
with a supreme authority.  With this authority, the Church makes its focus 
“the normative guidance of human social life” and “represents the civitas 
humana,”37 an ideal human society, regardless of the political order with 
which it is aligned.38 
29. Id. at 4–6. 
30. Id.
 31. Id. at 4. 
32. Id. at 7. 
33. Id.
 34. Id. at 16. 
35. Id. at 17. 
36. Id. at 19. 
37.  Id. at 12, 19. 
38. Id. at 18. 
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Second, as the representation of a “unique power and authority,”39 the 
Church demands public recognition from the state.40  There is a juridical,
or legal, aspect to the Church, and its normative instruction for the ordering 
of social life must be expressed publicly and through law.41  Schmitt was 
not clear, however, on the precise form of the relationship between church 
and state. At one point, he hypothesized an anarchical world of private 
ordering, entirely devoid of political agency, and claimed that, in such a 
world, “the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy 
would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle 
Ages.”42  But Schmitt rejected this arrangement.  Without further explanation, 
he wrote that “[a]ccording to its own theory and hypothetical structure, 
the Church would not wish for such a situation.”43  Instead, the Church seeks
a partnership with the state in which the two entities form a “special 
community” as a “societas perfecta”—a true or perfect society.44 
The political idea of Catholicism thus contemplates the coexistence of 
two distinct political entities. Church and state are not, however, meant
to be entirely separate.  The Church is an “equal partner with the state,”45 
acting cooperatively in the public sphere.  Schmitt wrote that “[t]he juridical 
foundation of the Catholic Church” rests on its outward “form as a visible 
institution.”46 The Church must be part of the public sphere.  It cannot be
privatized or excluded from participation in governing the social and political 
order. 
Third, the Church’s demand for public recognition conflicts with
liberalism, which seeks to privatize religion.47  According to Schmitt, 
liberalism imposes a kind of technical economic rationality on the realm 
of politics, wherein individual preferences are weighed and balanced to 
produce compromises satisfying various private interests.48  Within “economic 
thinking,” as Schmitt described it, religious claims are deemed to be “no 
less irrational than many senseless whims of fashion, which also demand 
satisfaction.”49 There is nothing unique or special about religious commitments, 
which are preferences that can be met like any other in the market.  Schmitt 
39. Id. at 30. 
40. Id. at 31 (“The Church commands recognition as the Bride of Christ; it represents
Christ reigning, ruling and conquering.”). 
41. See id. at 12. 
42. Id. at 25. 
43. Id.
 44. Id.
 45. Id. at 30. 
46.  Id. at 29, 32. 
47. Id. at 29 (“The juridical foundation of the Catholic Church on the public sphere
contrasts with liberalism’s foundation on the private sphere.”). 
48. See id. at 16. 
49. Id. at 16. 
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derided this “economic-technical apparatus” and viewed this kind of 
rationality as in conflict with that of the Church.50  Liberalism fails to comprehend 
the Church as the representative of supreme authority and so must be an 
adversary or enemy of Catholicism.51 
So far, we have focused on three main ideas in Schmitt’s political analysis
of Catholicism: that the Church can adapt its political form as a complexio
oppositorum because its essence is to represent transcendent authority;
that such authority demands public recognition and equal partnership with
the state; and that Catholicism conflicts with liberalism, which privatizes 
religion and rejects the public partnership that the Church commands. 
For purposes of understanding contemporary integralism and other
forms of religious antiliberalism, however, it is also important to note 
Schmitt’s later refinement in his understanding of the concept of the political. 
In Roman Catholicism and Political Form, Schmitt was not entirely clear 
in defining the concept.  He juxtaposed economic or technical rationality
with a conception of political power based on authority and, perhaps more
fundamentally, on an ideational or transcendent “ethos of belief.”52 But 
in his later work, The Concept of the Political, Schmitt defined the political 
according to a specific criterion, namely, the distinction between friend 
and enemy.53  For Schmitt, the enemy is “existentially something different
and alien” from the friend, such that “in the extreme case conflicts with 
him are possible.”54  Those who constitute a political entity are “friends” in
the sense that they are willing to kill their enemies, defined as those outside
that entity. The political entails the “ever present possibility of combat,” 
conflict, and war.55 
The friend-enemy distinction does not provide its own substantive content.56 
It can be based on moral, cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious grounds. 
An idea becomes political when a group of people is prepared to exercise 
coercive power and to engage in physical conflict over it.57  Schmitt noted 
that religious communities can become political because “[t]he political 
50. Id. at 15. 
51. Id. at 38. 
52. Id. at 17. 
53. SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 26. 
54. Id. at 27. 
55. Id. at 32. 
56.  Id. at 26, 38. 
57. Id. at 37. 
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can derive its energy from the most varied human endeavors” including 
“from the religious.”58 
Schmitt’s later concept of the political does not map neatly onto his 
earlier understanding of the political idea in his analysis of Catholicism.59 
But in both instances, liberalism functions as a foil.  Liberalism attempts
to avoid or suppress the friend-enemy distinction by limiting the power of 
the state and of the church. A liberal state does this by granting individual 
freedom in matters of ethics, morality, and religion, on one side, and by allowing
competition, rather than combat, in economic markets, on the other. Schmitt 
denied that this strategy of ethical and economic privatization can be successful
in escaping the friend-enemy distinction, which always reemerges.60 This
inevitable failure of liberalism in Schmitt’s view suggests a possible route 
to reconciling his later concept of the political with his earlier political idea of 
Catholicism.  To the extent liberalism privatizes religion, and thereby denies 
the Church’s demands for public recognition, it makes an enemy of the Church.  
And where the friend-enemy relation holds, coercion and conflict are an 
ever present possibility. 
B. Catholic Integralism 
In one form or another, all of the main ideas we have identified in Schmitt’s 
work are reproduced or reconfigured in contemporary expressions of Catholic
integralism. That is partly because Schmitt’s philosophical reconstruction 
of Catholicism as a political idea reflects nineteenth century integralist
commitments, which are being carried forward, and partly because integralists
and other religious antiliberals have relied directly on his work. In particular, 
58. Id. at 38. 
59. There is disagreement among scholars as to whether Schmitt abandoned his 
Catholic conception of the political in his later work, The Concept of the Political. Heinrich 
Meier argues that Schmitt embraced a Catholic political theology throughout his works.  
See generally  HEINRICH MEIER, THE LESSON OF CARL SCHMITT: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Marcus Brainard 
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1994).  But this view has elicited criticism, both for failing 
to account for important historical context, including Schmitt’s excommunication from the 
Catholic Church prior to writing The Concept of the Political, and for disregarding clear 
shifts in the nature of Schmitt’s argument.  See John P. McCormick, Political Theory and 
Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl Schmitt in English, 26 POL. THEORY 830, 
836 (1998).  As McCormick argues, persuasively in our view, “Schmitt no longer appeals 
to any theological resources [in the Concept of the Political],” and the core criterion of the 
political, the friend-enemy distinction, “is theorized as completely autonomous from all 
other distinctions, including theological ones.” Id. at 836–37.  Of course, as suggested above, it 
is open to contemporary integralists to synthesize Schmitt’s concepts of the political.  We 
return to this point in Section II.C. 
60. See SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 70–71. 
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Adrian Vermeule has drawn explicitly on Schmitt’s writings in updating 
arguments for integralism and advancing a political conception of the Church. 
For Vermeule, as for Schmitt, liberalism is the historical and perpetual
enemy of Catholicism.61  While pretending to maintain neutrality between 
conceptions of the good, the liberal state “attempts to privatize thick
commitments and to either quarantine comprehensive substantive views 
about the proper ends of politics, or transform them into reasonable 
‘preferences.’”62  The liberal state rejects recognition of the Church’s unique
authority to imbue a society with a higher purpose.  Liberalism instead is 
a relentlessly aggressive and destructive force that purports to liberate us
from irrationality and superstition but, in actuality, undermines the traditional 
forms of social order—familiar gender roles, stable marriages, extended 
families, religious communities, and so on—that enable us to make sense 
of our lives.63 
The integralist narrative of liberalism’s aggression against traditional 
institutions, including and especially the Church, takes one of two directions.64 
In the first, again following Schmitt, liberalism is self-destructive.65 It 
systematically eliminates the traditional sources of moral and social 
legitimation for a political society.  When the social order has been eviscerated, 
all that remains is a mass of disaffected economic consumers, who will 
revolt against the political system that has hollowed out their lives.  Vermeule 
anticipates that “[t]he sheer plasticity and restless liberationism of the 
regime exceed the populace’s appetite for freedom, and a kind of rebellion 
against the principles of the regime itself will occur.”66  The prospect of
political revolution might then open the way for Catholic integralism, which 
preserves the sources of traditional meaning and provides the spiritual 
authority to fill the vacuum created by liberalism.67 
61. Vermeule, supra note 5 (“The Church’s role as liberalism’s principal target and
antagonist is also structurally embedded.”). 
62. Vermeule, supra note 22. 
63. Vermeule, supra note 5. 
64. See id.
 65. See SCHMITT, supra note 22, at 27–28; see also DENEEN, supra note 7, at 18–19.
 66. Vermeule, supra note 22. 
67. See Adrian Vermeule, “According to the Truth,” JOSIAS (July 19, 2018), 
https://thejosias.com/2018/07/19/according-to-truth [https://perma.cc/B9LL-QXJN] (“The
hunger for the real might then make people so desperate, so sick of the essential falsity of
liberalism, that the become willing to gamble that the Truth . . . will prevail . . . .”); see




SCHWARTZMAN_56-4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2019 12:22 PM      
 
 







     
  
   
       
 
     
      
 
      
 
       
      
      
    
 
   
    
    
  
   
From an integralist perspective, this narrative is the optimistic version, 
wherein liberalism’s collapse leads to the creation of an integrated society.
But Vermeule sometimes offers a different account, in which liberalism 
does not destroy itself but rather fulfills its own inner logic by becoming
totalizing in its repressiveness and demand for social conformity.68  In this
story, liberalism functions as a comprehensive and substantive worldview.  
It has rituals and sacraments, which take the form of public shaming of 
those who express or harbor illiberal or traditional religious views.69  And 
liberalism is said to have a “basic liturgy” in the “Festival of Reason,” a reference 
by Vermeule to anticlerical ceremonies associated with the “dechristianization” 
campaign of the French Revolution.70  This idea—that liberalism has sacraments,
rituals, and a liturgy, which are reenacted through “new iterations and 
celebrations of the Festival”71—is generally consistent with a broader 
antiliberal critique that describes liberalism as a religion, often as a form 
of “modern paganism,” as in the work of T.S. Eliot72 and, more recently,
Steven D. Smith, R.R. Reno, and others.73 
Whether liberalism eventually self-destructs or whether it persists as a 
relentless oppressive force, integralists face a practical question about how to
respond politically. Some religious conservatives have argued that religious 
citizens ought to withdraw from liberal society and establish local or communal 
enclaves, which might help to insulate them against the vices of contemporary
social and political culture.74  Others argue for the reclamation of a liberalism
that might, in turn, be compatible with the flourishing of traditional religion.75 
68. Vermeule, supra note 5 (“A different view, and my own, is that liberal intolerance
represents not the self-undermining of liberalism, but the fulfillment of its essential nature.”). 
69. See Vermeule, supra note 7; see also Adrian Vermeule, All Politics is Ultimately
Theological, CHURCH LIFE J. (July 26, 2019), https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/all-
human-conflict-is-ultimately-theological [https://perma.cc/HX3Q-P8KU].
70. Vermeule, supra note 5; cf. MONA OZOUF,FESTIVALS AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
97–99 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1988) (discussing the “Festival of Reason”). 
71. Vermeule, supra note 7. 
72. See T. S. ELIOT, CHRISTIANITY & CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY
AND NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 6 (1948).  For criticism of Eliot’s distinction 
between Christianity and paganism, including its overt anti-Semitism, see Richard Schragger 
& Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497, 499–504 (2019). 
73. See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE 
WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018); R.R. RENO, RESURRECTING THE IDEA OF
A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY (2016); Charles J. Caput, The Future of the West: Christian or Pagan?,
CRISIS MAG. (June 9, 2017), https://www.crisismagazine.com/2017/future-west-christian-
pagan [https://perma.cc/RWJ2-X9RH]. But cf. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 72, at
505–10 (criticizing Smith’s view, drawing on Eliot, which equates liberalism with paganism).
74. See generally DENEEN, supra note 7; ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION:
A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POST-CHRISTIAN NATION (2017).
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But Vermeule argues that these strategies are shortsighted and nostalgic 
for a time when liberalism was less hostile to Catholicism.  In his view,
liberalism is too relentlessly aggressive for these strategies to work.  He writes
that “[t]here is no reason to think that a stable, long-term rapprochement
between Catholicism and the liberal state is realistically feasible.”76 
Instead of withdrawing from society or attempting to tame liberalism,
integralists should promote a strategy of ralliement,77 which Vermeule 
specifies as “rallying” to the liberal state in order to “transform it from 
within.”78 Drawing from Schmitt, Vermeule emphasizes the Church’s
“strategic flexibility” and its capacity to align itself with different types of 
political organization to advance its spiritual ends.79  “A Christian politics 
opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-
region [https://perma.cc/F5JA-4JDD]; Richard W. Garnett, Mild and Equitable Establishments, 
FIRST THINGS (April 2019), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2019/04/mild-and-equitable-
establishments [https://perma.cc/Y7L2-J4MM]; Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Defending American 
Classical Liberalism, NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/ 
06/american-classical-liberalism-response-to-radical-catholics [https://perma.cc/KCC2-24N7];
R.R. Reno, Liberal Tradition, Yes; Liberal Ideology, No, FIRST THINGS (Dec. 2017), https://
www.firstthings.com/article/2017/12/liberal-tradition-yes-liberal-ideology-no [https://perma.cc/ 
TJA4-T3DN].
 76. Adrian Vermeule, As Secular Liberalism Attacks the Church, Catholics Can’t Afford
To Be Nostalgic, CATH. HERALD (Jan. 5, 2018), https://catholicherald.co.uk/commentand
blogs/2018/01/05/as-secular-liberalism-attacks-the-church-catholics-cant-afford-to-be-
nostalgic [https://perma.cc/TP5V-KZNB]; see also Adrian Vermeule, Some Confusions 
About “Classical Liberalism,” Progressivism, and Necessity, MIRROR JUST. (June 15, 2018),
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2018/06/some-confusions-about-classical-
liberalism-progressivism-and-necessity.html [https://perma.cc/5FUM-669V] (criticizing
“classical liberalism” as lacking stability and having a “structural propensity” toward the 
repression of religious dissent). 
77. The term originally refers to Pope Leo XIII’s policy of calling on Catholics to
cooperate with the French Third Republic to promote the common good. See Pope Leo
XIII, Au Milieu Des Solicitudes, LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, http://w2.vatican.va/content/
leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_16021892_au-milieu-des-sollicitudes.html
[https://perma.cc/JZ3S-5VC4]. The strategy ralliement has been the subject of much debate
among integralists in recent years. See, e.g., P.J. Smith, Ralliement and the Common
Good, SEMIDUPLEX (July 30, 2017), https://semiduplex.com/2017/07/30/ralliement-and-
the-common-good [https://perma.cc/9KKR-6VJU]; Felix de St. Vincent, Four Catholic 
Political Postures: Lessons from Leo XIII and Ralliement, JOSIAS (July 31, 2017), 
https://thejosias.com/2017/07/31/four-catholic-political-postures-lessons-from-leo-xiii-
and-ralliement/#_ftn18 [https://perma.cc/U9HE-PLVM]; Edmund Waldstein, Catholic 
Action and Ralliement, SANCRUCENSIS (Feb. 12, 2016), https://sancrucensis.wordpress.com/
2016/02/12/catholic-action-and-ralliement [https://perma.cc/7UGT-D6J4]. 
 78. Adrian Vermeule, Ralliement: Two Distinctions, JOSIAS (Mar. 16, 2018), https://
thejosias.com/2018/03/16/ralliement-two-distinctions [https://perma.cc/QZV7-UUGE].
79. Vermeule, supra note 5. 
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must always be strategic,” Vermeule writes, “viewing political commitments 
not as articles of a sacred faith, but as tactical tools to be handled in whatever 
way best serves the cause of Christ.”80  To be sure, the goal of this “Christian 
strategy” is not to seek accommodation with liberalism, but rather to coopt 
the liberal administrative state with “a view to eventually superseding it 
altogether.”81  In the long run, and taking another page from Schmitt, Vermeule 
argues that the Catholic Church can dispense with parliamentary democracy,
which is infected by liberalism.82  Hierarchical bureaucracies of executive
power, however, are better suited to promoting an integralist political order.83 
Contemporary Catholic integralists are not entirely clear about their
vision for a postliberal political society. At times, Vermeule suggests that 
when liberalism has destroyed itself, the Church “will be the only genuinely
political global entity left standing.”84 In this political eschatology, Vermeule
seems to embrace a possibility that Schmitt rejected, which is the erasure 
of any distinction between the Church and the state.  Similarly, Edmund 
Waldstein suggests that integralists might seek to reestablish the conditions 
of medieval society in which “‘church’ and ‘state’ did not exist as separate
institutions; rather, spiritual and temporal authority cooperated together 
within a single social whole for the establishment of an earthly peace,
ordered to eternal salvation.”85 
In a society in which secular and clerical institutions are differentiated, 
however, integralists agree that the state must at least recognize the special 
authority of the Catholic Church and promote the common good as the 
Church understands it.  Vermeule writes that “Catholic integralism rightly
holds out hope for a political regime ordered proximately to the common
good and ultimately to the Divine,”86 but he is not specific about how church 
and state should be related in a differentiated system.  Other integralists
are more detailed and explicit.  Waldstein argues for a model in which the
state assumes a pedagogical function to advance the Church’s spiritual 
ends.87  In this arrangement, the state may exercise coercive power to 
80. Id.
 81. Vermeule, supra note 78. 
82. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy
trans., MIT Press 1985) (1923). 
83. Vermeule, supra note 78 (“The ideal-type principles of hierarchy and unity of
top-level command that animate bureaucracy, especially but not only military and security 
bureaucracies, are not obviously the sort of principles that threaten to inscribe liberalism 
within the hearts and minds of participants.”). 
84. Vermeule, supra note 22.
 85. Waldstein, supra note 5. 
86. Vermeule, supra note 76. 
87. Waldstein, supra note 5. 
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instruct and correct citizens who have strayed from God’s truth.88  A
somewhat different model is described by Thomas Pink, who calls for
a “confessional Catholic state.”89  In this type of regime, the Church maintains
sole authority over matters of religion, while the state has jurisdiction over 
civil matters.  But crucially, church and state are equally entitled to legislate 
in their respective domains and “to enforce that law through punishments.”90 
Like Waldstein, Pink argues that in the Catholic tradition, the state has a
pedagogical purpose and that a “central mode of teaching is through legal
coercion.”91 
Catholic integralists may diverge on the details of the ideal relationship 
between church and state, and on how to achieve that ideal, but they
are unified in their view that “temporal power,” as exercised by the secular
authorities, must be “subordinated to the spiritual power”92 of the Church.
And they agree that liberalism is anathema to this view.  There can be no
stable truce, or modus vivendi, between the liberal state and the Church. 
In Schmittian terms, the friend-enemy distinction is coded in terms of 
liberalism and Catholicism, and the hope of integralism is that the political
idea of the Church will prevail. 
C. The Intra-Conservative Debate 
Until recently, integralist thought did not have much presence in mainstream 
public discourse.  But a recent debate among American conservatives has
introduced aspects of integralism into a broader argument about whether
conservatives should maintain a commitment to the liberal democratic 
project. This debate was initiated by Sohrab Ahmari in an attack on what
he calls “David French-ism,” after the Christian conservative lawyer and 
88. In a line that would thrill inquisitors of old, Waldstein approves of St. Benedict’s
view that “if a brother is unable to be corrected by exclusion from the communal prayers
and meals, then he should be whipped—a punishment that even carnal minds understand.” 
Id.
 89. Pink, supra note 5. 
90. Id.; see also Thomas Pink, The Right to Religious Liberty and the Coercion of
Belief: A Note on Dignitatis Humanae, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF JOHN FINNIS 427, 437–42 (John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 2013); Thomas Pink, 
Conscience and Coercion: Vatican II’s Teaching on Religious Freedom Changed Policy, 
Not Doctrine, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2012), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2012/08/
conscience-and-coercion [https://perma.cc/Z4L4-MNHL].
91. Pink, supra note 5. 
92. Edmund Waldstein, Integralism in Three Sentences, JOSIAS (Oct. 17, 2016), 
http://thejosias.com/2016/10/17/integralism-in-three-sentences [https://perma.cc/9KUF-BJUZ]. 
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writer, David French, who Ahmari takes as a representative of mainstream
American religious conservativism.93 
Ahmari’s central complaint against French, and other religious conservatives 
who espouse a commitment to “classical liberalism,” is that he misunderstands 
the nature of liberal politics and “the depth of the present crisis facing
religious conservatives.”94  “French-ism” is the view that the state should
not take sides in religious conflicts, that it should respect civil liberties
and refrain from intervening in economic markets, and that conservative 
Christians should treat those who hold contrary religious and ethical views 
with civility and respect.95  Ahmari questions all of these commitments,
which he sees as forms of unliteral disarmament in an existential cultural 
and political war with liberalism.96  “Such talk—of politics as war and 
enmity—is thoroughly alien to French,” Ahmari writes, “because he believes
that the institutions of a technocratic market society are neutral zones that 
should, in theory, accommodate both traditional Christianity and the libertine 
ways and paganized ideology of the other side.”97 
The influence of Schmittian and integralist ideas in this critique is 
unmistakable.  Ahmari relies on a conception of politics that synthesizes 
the Schmittian concepts of the political, so that the authoritative claims of
traditional religion—as represented by the Catholic Church—are mapped 
onto the friend-enemy distinction.  His reference to a “technocratic market 
society” reflects Schmitt’s characterization of liberalism as attempting to
“depoliticize[] politics,”98 and his description of liberalism as a “paganized
ideology” is, as noted above, familiar from the writings of recent antiliberal
critics.99  For Ahmari, following Schmitt, Vermeule, and other integralists, 
the public sphere can never be neutral. It is always the site of existential 
conflict between competing political theologies.100  That is why he urges
Christians “to fight the culture war with the aim of defeating the enemy
and enjoying the spoils in the form of a public square re-ordered to the
common good and ultimately the Highest Good.”101 




 95. See id.
 96. See id.
 97. Id.
 98. Id.
 99. See generally Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 12; Schragger & Schwartzman,
supra note 72. 
100. Ahmari, supra note 93 (“Progressives understand that culture war means discrediting 
their opponents and weakening or destroying their institutions.  Conservatives should approach 
the culture war with a similar realism.”). 
101. Id.
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French frames his response to Ahmari as a “zealous defense of the
classical-liberal order (with a special emphasis on civil liberties) and zealous 
advocacy of fundamentally Christian and Burkean conservative principles.”102 
Placing himself within the tradition of “American liberalism,” he rejects
the view of “politics as war” and seeks to lessen enmity rather than accept
it as essential to the concept of the political.103  French argues that religious
pluralism is a permanent feature of American politics, to which the appropriate 
response is to “recommit to our shared citizenship and preserve a space
for all American voices, even as we compete against those voices in politics
and the marketplace of ideas.”104 
The Ahmari-French debate has exposed a rift between American religious
conservatives.105  While some remain committed to the framework of liberal
democratic politics, others are willing to embrace a “post-liberal” or integralist 
view in which liberalism is seen as a relentless, oppressive, and theological 
enemy—a pagan, or satanic,106 force that seeks to destroy traditional 
Christianity.  For those who adopt the latter perspective, the only choice 
is to wage political warfare, which requires subordinating the public 
virtues of civility, politeness, moderation, and toleration.  As Ahmari puts 
it, “Civility and decency are secondary values. . . . We should seek to use 
102. David French, What Sohrab Ahmari Gets Wrong, NAT’L REV. (May 30, 2019, 




105. There seems to be an emerging “post-liberal” coalition among some religious 
conservatives, whose views are reflected by Ahmari and an expressed in a manifesto recently
published in First Things. See Sohrab Ahmari et al., Against the Dead Consensus, FIRST
THINGS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/03/against-
the-dead-consensus [https://perma.cc/J6AQ-LJZ6].  For more and less journalistic accounts of
these developments, see Ross Douthat, What Are Conservatives Actually Debating?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/opinion/conservatives-david-
french-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4EPT-AJBF]; Alexander Zaitchik, Is Josh Hawley
For Real?, NEW REPUBLIC (July 25, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154526/josh-
hawley-real [https://perma.cc/QVG3-D6EU]  (discussing the rise of the post-liberal movement). 
106. See Vermeule, supra note 5 (“Liberalism’s deepest enmity, it seems, is ultimately 
reserved for the Blessed Virgin—and thus Genesis 3:15 and Revelation 12:1–9, which 
describe the Virgin’s implacable enemy, give us the best clue as to liberalism’s true 
identity.”).  Vermeule’s biblical references are to the serpent in Genesis and to the dragon 
in Revelation, both representations of Satan.  See Revelation 12:9 (New American Bible) 
(“The huge dragon, the ancient serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, who deceived 
the whole world, was thrown down to earth, and its angels were thrown down with it.”). 
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these values to enforce our order and our orthodoxy, not pretend that they 
could ever be neutral.”107  
III. WHY CATHOLIC INTEGRALISM IS UNREASONABLE
We have attempted to give an accurate, fair, and charitable description 
of the main ideas of Catholic integralism, including its political conception of
the Church and its critique of liberalism. We now turn to our main criticism
of integralism, which is that, as a political doctrine, it conflicts with a liberal 
conception of reasonableness that draws together and expresses some of
the deepest moral and epistemic commitments implicit in liberal democratic
political culture.
We preface our argument that integralism is unreasonable with three
points. First, our claim is limited to Catholic integralism and, if there are 
other forms of religious integralism, perhaps to those doctrines as well.
Our criticism does not extend to Catholicism more generally,108 and we take
no view on whether integralism is a plausible, let alone proper, interpretation 
of Catholicism.109  Second, to forestall confusion, our conception of
reasonableness is a liberal one.  As we shall explain, it is not value neutral.110 
107. Ahmari, supra note 93. In arguing for subordinating civility and other public 
virtues, Ahmari seems to have borrowed an idea from Vermeule.  See Vermeule, supra 
note 67 (“Liberalism muffles the political in second-order concepts like ‘civility’ and 
‘tolerance’ and ‘choice,’ and the hunger for real politics rightly rebels against this.  But it 
does not follow that these concepts have no value at all, when rightly placed within a larger 
ordering to good substantive ends.  If civility, tolerance, and their ilk are bad masters, and 
tyrannous when made into idols, they may still be good servants.”). 
108. For arguments that Catholicism is consistent with a liberal conception
of reasonableness, see Rawls, supra note 14, at 603 n.75; see also Leslie C. Griffin, 
Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297, 325, 327–29 
(1997).
109. Pope Francis has been critical of integralists. See Gerald O’Connell, Pope Urges
E.U. Politicians to Avoid 20th Century Conflicts, AM. MAG. (June 2, 2019), https://www.
americamagazine.org/faith/2019/06/02/pope-urges-eu-politicians-avoid-20th-century-
conflicts [https://perma.cc/ET4N-NHEA] (quoting Pope Francis as saying, “The nostalgia 
of the integralists is to return to the ashes.  No!  Traditions are roots that guarantee that the 
tree grows, blossoms and bears fruit.”). 
110. For this reason, it is a mistake to understand the charge of unreasonableness as 
an insult that trades on some ordinary uses of the term. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, The 
Moral Commitments of Liberalism, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 292, 309 (David Copp, 
Jean Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993) (arguing that on one interpretation of the 
idea of reasonableness, political liberals are “saying . . . not merely that antiliberals are 
wrong, but also that they do not meet the canons of acceptable reasoning.  It is one thing 
to call your opponents wrong; it is quite another to say they hold their incorrect views only 
because they have been unable to form their beliefs in a fully rational and reasonable 
way”).  If the claim that a doctrine is unreasonable has a normative sting to it, that is, in 
our view, because of the force of the moral and epistemic content attributed to a conception 
of reasonableness.  And, if anything, the liberal conception on which we rely is more 
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This conception contains substantive moral and epistemic content.111  There
are other conceptions of reasonableness, including some that are purely
epistemic and that focus on standards of ordinary or acceptable reasoning.112 
And, of course, the concept of reasonableness is used in a wide range of
legal doctrines.113  Here, we set all of that aside.  Our argument is based on a
specific conception of reasonableness that has played an important role in 
the development of political liberalism.114  Third, although we explicate this
conception of reasonableness, we do not offer a defense of it here.  Others 
have provided powerful arguments for the account on which we rely,115 
but full justifications for it must proceed ultimately from the various
comprehensive religious, ethical, and philosophical views of citizens in a
liberal democratic society.116  That project may be aided by a better
tolerant and less exclusionary than traditional philosophical accounts that dismiss competing 
views on the grounds that they are objectively mistaken.  See David Estlund, The Truth in
Political Liberalism, in TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 251, 253 (Jeremy Elkins & Andrew Norris
eds., 2012) (“The idea of ‘reasonable’ points of view strikes some people as insulting to 
other (‘unreasonable’) views, but it is important to keep in mind that one of the main positions
being opposed by this doctrine is that viewpoints that are mistaken, no matter how reasonable
they might be, may be ignored completely.  The Rawlsian denies this, and is thus more 
tolerant and liberal in an important sense. The whole point of the Rawlsian view is to give
moral standing to certain viewpoints even if they are mistaken.”).
111. That a conception of reasonableness has substantive moral content does not
entail that this conception is part of either a fully comprehensive or perfectionist account 
of liberalism.  On the differences between political, comprehensive, and perfectionist 
forms of liberalism, see QUONG, supra note 13, at 15–21; Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist 
Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (2011). 
112. For alternative philosophical conceptions of reasonableness, see generally CHARLES
LARMORE, THEAUTONOMY OF MORALITY 143 (2008); CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, REASONABLENESS 
AND FAIRNESS: A HISTORICAL THEORY 61–100 (2016); James W. Boettcher, What is 
Reasonableness?, 30 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 597, 603–06 (2004); Margaret Moore, On 
Reasonableness, 13 J. APPLIED PHIL. 167, 168–70 (1996); Daniel M. Weinstock, A Neutral 
Conception of Reasonableness?, 3 EPISTEME 234, 238 (2006). 
113. See generally REASONABLENESS AND LAW (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor
& Chiara Valentini eds., 2009). 
114. See generally RAWLS, supra note 13, at 48–66(explaining the idea of reasonableness 
and applying it to a political conception of the person and to comprehensive doctrines); 
see also SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 345–51 (2007) (discussing the centrality of the idea of 
reasonableness in Rawls’s account of political liberalism). 
115. See, e.g., PAUL WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM?: ON JOHN RAWLS’S 
POLITICAL TURN 357–62 (2010) (offering a defense of political liberalism and its conception of 
reasonableness); see also  LORI WATSON & CHRISTIE HARTLEY, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND 
PUBLIC REASON: A FEMINIST POLITICAL LIBERALISM 40–61 (2018); R.J. Leland, Civic Friendship, 
Public Reason, 47 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 72, 75–85 (2019). 
116. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 386 (explaining that full justification of a political
conception is “left to each citizen, individually or in association with others”); see also 
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understanding of a liberal conception of reasonableness, including its 
content, structure, and limitations. In setting out this liberal conception and 
by applying it to the example of Catholic integralism, we hope to show 
that the liberal view is an attractive one, in part because it can explain why 
those who are sympathetic to the liberal democratic project find central
aspects of integralism to be objectionable. 
A. Liberal Reasonableness 
The conception of reasonableness that lies at the center of much liberal 
political philosophy, and which is especially well developed in political
liberalism, has two main aspects.117  The first is that people are reasonable
when they accept the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation 
between free and equal citizens.118  The second is that they accept what
John Rawls calls the fact of reasonable pluralism, which is that, in any 
free society, there will be a wide diversity of comprehensive religious, 
ethical, and philosophical views that result from citizens exercising their 
powers of reason in good faith.119  Although each of these aspects of 
reasonableness has been the subject of extensive discussion, we provide a
brief sketch of each in turn.120 
The first aspect of reasonableness begins with the idea that society is a
system of fair social cooperation.  In such a system, people act in a relation
of reciprocity, in which each person is motivated to do their fair share 
under rules that can be justified to everyone involved, provided that others 
are similarly motivated.121  There will, of course, be disagreements about
how to understand the idea of fairness.  But here the important point is 
that society is not a system of domination, unlike a hierarchical, feudal, or 
colonial regime, in which one individual, or group of individuals, is permitted 
to exploit and to benefit systematically at the expense of another.122 
Instead, at the most abstract level, society is conceived as a cooperative 
project, whose constitutive rules can be publicly accepted by those who
live under them.123 
QUONG, supra note 13, at 238 (arguing for a “buck-passing” strategy in which it is the “task of
citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, not the task of liberal political theory” to ground the 
political liberalism’s basic moral and epistemic commitments, including its conception of
reasonableness).
117. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 48–58; see also QUONG, supra note 13, at 37–38, 
146 (citing RAWLS, supra note 13, at 54). 
118. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 15–19. 
119. Id. at 36–37. 
120. See, e.g., QUONG, supra note 13; Nussbaum, supra note 111. 
121. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 16. 
122. See QUONG, supra note 13, at 38. 
123. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 49. 
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In addition to understanding society as a system of fair social cooperation, 
reasonable people also conceive of other citizens, at least for political
purposes, as both free and equal.  The idea of freedom is specified according
to a conception of citizens as having a capacity “to form, to revise, and 
rationally pursue a conception of the good.”124  Citizens are equal in the
sense that they have this capacity, as well as the capacity to act from a sense 
of justice, to the degree necessary for participating as cooperative members 
of society.125 
The capacity to have and revise a conception of the good is especially
important as a basis for political freedom.  Citizens are considered to be 
free in the sense that their political status does not turn on whether they
maintain a particular conception of the good.  Rawls gives the example of
Saul of Tarsus becoming Paul the Apostle.126  Or we might consider the 
recent conversions of Vermeule and Ahmari to Catholicism.127  In a liberal 
democracy, religious conversion has no bearing on a citizen’s political or
legal identity.  Citizens are free when they can undergo significant changes 
in their religious, ethical, and philosophical views without affecting their 
basic rights and liberties.128  And citizens are equal in the sense that rights
and liberties are not distributed differently to citizens depending on whether 
they adhere to a particular conception of the good, but only on the basis 
of whether they have the relevant moral powers to the requisite degree. 
It should be clear that the liberal conception of reasonableness described
so far has substantive moral content.  Proponents of this conception are 
not agnostic on this point.129  To see citizens as free and equal in the relevant
sense is to accept that basic features of one’s political identity, including 
one’s status as a citizen and the attribution of fundamental political rights 
and duties, generally ought to be determined without regard to one’s religious, 
124. Id. at 72. 
125. See id. at 19. 
126. Id. at 31. 
127. See Adrian Vermeule, Finding Stable Ground, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 4, 2016), 
https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2016/11/finding-stable-ground [https://perma.cc/
RKR2-FHQG]. 
128. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at 30 (“[W]hen citizens convert from one religion to 
another, or no longer affirm an established religious faith, they do not cease to be, for 
questions of political justice, the same persons they were before.”). 
129. See Rawls, supra note 14, at 802 n.91 (“Perhaps some think that a political 
conception is a not a matter of (moral) right and wrong.  If so, that is a mistake and simply 
false.”).  The same holds for the idea of reasonableness that forms part of the basis for 
specifying a political conception of justice. 
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ethical, or philosophical views.130  That citizens’ political identities should 
be structured in this way is a deep feature of the political morality of liberal 
democratic societies. 
The liberal conception of reasonableness is thus partly a complex moral 
idea. But it also has an epistemic component.  As mentioned above, the 
second aspect of reasonableness is that citizens must accept the fact of
reasonable pluralism.  In democratic societies that protect basic liberties,
including the freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, citizens can 
be expected to hold a wide diversity of comprehensive conceptions of the 
good.  This type of pluralism is a permanent feature of such societies.  It 
cannot be eradicated without the use of oppressive state power.131 
Reasonable citizens need not value such diversity, but neither should
they regard it as demonic or morally catastrophic.132  Instead, the diversity
of views that characterizes liberal democratic societies may be seen as the 
result of citizens reasoning and acting in good faith under the “burdens of 
judgment,” which describe some standard obstacles to practical and theoretical 
reasoning.133 On this view, pluralism is not merely a fact about liberal
democratic political cultures, but a reasonable one.  And it is reasonable 
130. We recognize that some legal entitlements may be tied to one’s ability to assert
claims based on particular conceptions of the good.  For example, some legal regimes 
require that those seeking religious exemptions have sincere religious beliefs that give rise 
to their claims.  This example can be consistent with the conception of freedom described 
above, provided that rights to seek exemptions are distributed equally among those with 
comparable claims given their particular conceptions of the good and provided that basic 
rights are secured regardless of which conceptions of the good are held by citizens.  See 
RAWLS, supra note 13, at 30 (explaining that when citizens engage in religious conversion, 
“[t]here is no loss of what we may call their public, or institutional identity, or their identity 
as a matter of basic law.  In general, they still have the same basic rights and duties . . . 
except insofar as these claims were connected with their previous religious affiliation.”). 
131. Id. at 37. 
132.  What we say here is compatible with believing that some comprehensive doctrines
are unreasonable, immoral, or evil.  Our claim is that the fact of pluralism itself should not 
be characterized in this way, rather than any particular instantiation of it. 
133. RAWLS, supra note 13 at 54–58.  The burdens of judgment include: the complexity
of empirical evidence, differences in how to weigh competing moral considerations, vagueness 
of moral and political concepts, divergent background experiences relevant to assessing 
evidence and weighing values, and difficulties in making moral trade-offs.  See id. at 56– 
57. Rawls claims that acceptance of the burdens of judgement is part of what it means to 
be reasonable.  Id. at 54.  This view is controversial, and some who are otherwise sympathetic 
to political liberalism have rejected it.  See STEVEN LECCE, AGAINST PERFECTIONISM: 
DEFENDING LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 203 (2008); CATRIONA MCKINNON, LIBERALISM AND 
THE DEFENCE OF POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 45–56 (2002).  Although we cannot pursue 
this issue here, our view is that the burdens of judgment provide a plausible account of 
reasonable disagreement and that some such account is necessary to explain why pluralism 
is the permanent result of citizens reasoning in good faith under conditions of freedom.  
See QUONG, supra note 13, at 245–46. 
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because it is the result of citizens exercising their rational capacities under 
conditions of freedom.134 
Drawing together the moral and epistemic aspects of reasonableness
leads to some important political conclusions.  Citizens are reasonable when 
they are willing to propose fair terms of social cooperation to others who 
they see as free and equal.  And they recognize that others will hold 
comprehensive views that, like their own, are the result of good faith 
efforts to reason about moral and political questions.  Given that others 
are similarly situated, they will understand that they cannot simply propose
rules of cooperation that follow from their conceptions of the good.  Presumably
others would reciprocate by doing the same.  To be reasonable, they must
instead work to justify a set of rules that others might reasonably accept
despite disagreements about their respective religious, ethical, and philosophical 
views. They must find some common moral ground—a public basis that 
cannot be premised on any particular conception of the good—to support
their collective exercise of political power.135  Showing that such a basis
is available is, of course, the project of political liberalism.  Again, our
aim here is not to defend that project, but to explicate its basic assumptions 
and to apply them. 
B. Integralism’s Unreasonableness 
Catholic integralism is unreasonable because it violates each aspect of 
the liberal conception of reasonableness.  For starters, consider the idea of 
society as a fair system of social cooperation.  Integralists reject this view 
in favor of a Schmittian concept of the political, in which citizens with
competing conceptions of the good are engaged in politics as a form of 
134. RAWLS, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
135. The idea that reasonable citizens are committed to offering justifications that
others might reasonably accept leads to the idea of public reason.  See Rawls, supra note 
14, at 770–71.  See generally Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of Public Reason, in A COMPANION
TO RAWLS 265 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014); Micah Schwartzman, The 
Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 375, 378–79 (2011). But here we leave aside 
various complications involving different conceptions of public reason that have emerged 
in recent years. Integralists reject moral commitments that are common to many, and
perhaps all, liberal theories of public justification and public reason, and so our criticisms 
are more basic and need not rely on a more fully specified account.  For helpful discussions
of public reason and public justification, see Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason [https://perma.cc/
L3BE-RX4G]; Kevin Vallier, Public Justification, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/ [https://perma.cc/RY7W-8DM3].
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existential, theological, and cultural warfare.  In this way of understanding
politics, there is no space for reciprocity and fair cooperation, except as 
prudential means for coopting and eventually superseding the liberal state. 
Politics is, at most, a modus vivendi, in which integralists bide their time 
until the state is prepared to recognize the Church in its unique capacity
as a religious authority and equal partner in governing society.  This view 
of politics is unreasonable, because it refuses to recognize those with competing
religious and ethical perspectives as having valid and independent claims. 
Integralists are unwilling to offer fair terms to others.  At bottom, they are
committed to a view of political society as a system of religious domination. 
Of course, integralists may not be embarrassed by this characterization of
their view. They may well embrace it.136  But in its candor, the integralist
commitment to religious domination is nonetheless a brazen announcement 
of the doctrine’s unreasonableness. 
The political conception of the Church as a representation of divine
authority, with its singular claims to state recognition and to the use of
coercive power in matters of religion, also conflicts with the ideas of freedom
and equality in the liberal conception of reasonableness.  Consider, again,
the case of Edgardo Mortara, a Jewish child who was secretly baptized, 
forcibly separated from his parents, and then raised as a personal ward of 
Pope Pius IX.137  Here, we have a clear application of integralist principles.
Contemporary integralists have defended Pius IX’s decision as consistent 
with canon law and with the civil law of the Papal States.138  But their claims
go further. The Church represents Christ on earth, and if it has determined 
that the highest good is best served by taking baptized children from their 
non-Catholic parents and giving them a Catholic education, nothing can 
stand in the way of that conclusion.  And if the state is guided by the Church 
and applies its coercive power to achieve spiritual ends, or if the Church 
applies that power itself, again there is no gainsaying the political legitimacy 
of that exercise of religious authority. 
It should be obvious that integralism has no regard for the freedom and
equality of Mortara’s Jewish family.139  In a liberal society, citizens are
136. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Kyriarchy and Constitutionalism, MIRROR JUST.
(NOV. 29, 2016), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2016/11/kyriarchy-and-
constitutionalism.html [https://perma.cc/N8FK-76B5] (defining Kyriarchy as “the reign of
the risen and enthroned Lord” and arguing that defining this regime type as “intrinsically 
oppressive . . . begs the question against the Catholic perspective . . .”). 
137. See KERTZER, supra note 1, at 299. 
138. See supra note 4. 
139. Here we anticipate a response from integralists, who might claim that they respect 
the freedom and equality of religious minorities by requiring them to comply with laws 
that are consistent with religious truth.  But this answer is unreasonable, because it insists 
on imposing a view that many citizens reasonably regard as a controversial conception of 
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reasonable when they adopt comprehensive doctrines that respect others’
basic liberties, including the freedom of conscience, speech, and association. 
The Mortaras’ moral rights were violated when the Pope ordered the seizure 
of their son. Their religious liberty to raise their children in their own faith
was extinguished.  Of course, no Catholic integralist living in a non-Catholic 
state would ever recognize as legitimate such an action by the state if the 
circumstances were reversed, that is, if the state sought to seize a Catholic 
child.  In that situation, integralists would demand recognition of their religious 
freedom. That integralists reject the same freedom when it applies to
others signals their refusal to recognize citizens of other faiths as having 
equal basic rights. In a society ordered according to an integralist ideal,
religious minorities could not be secure in their freedom.  They would be 
subject to an external religious authority, imposed upon them by both the 
Church and state, in a political system that would deny their rational capacity 
for having, revising, and pursuing their own conception of the good.
In addition to restricting the basic liberties of religious minorities and 
nonbelievers, an integralist regime would also be committed to rejecting 
their political equality.  A state guided by the Church would subordinate 
those who reject its instruction and render them, at best, second-class citizens,
if not relegate them to some more degraded political status.  Those outside 
the faith would be excluded from the political decision-making process.
In a system structured according to a Schmittian conception of politics, they
would be treated as enemies of the regime, subject to the threat of coercion, 
violence, expulsion, or worse.140 
In a liberal democratic society, by contrast, citizens are thought of as 
standing in a relation of equality, which can be characterized as a form of
civic friendship.141  Citizens with diverse conceptions of the good do not
see themselves as enemies or foes, but rather as friends whose relationship 
religious truth and because, in so doing, it denies the substantive content of the ideas of freedom 
and equality within a liberal conception of reasonableness.  Again, we do not expect this
answer to move integralists, who reject what they call “procedural” liberal values.  But as
noted above, see supra note 116, whether integralists are persuaded is not the measure of 
justification for a conception of reasonableness and the moral ideas that guide our understanding 
of it. 
140. For a catalog of historical examples attributable to past integralist regimes, see 
Samuel C. Rickless, Paganism is Dead, Long Live Secularism, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 451, 
482–85 (2018).
141. See RAWLS, supra note 13, at xix. 
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is mediated through institutions of fair cooperation.142  But in an integralist
regime, where political relations are defined in terms of religious authority, 
and where citizens are encouraged to see those with unorthodox views as 
existential rivals, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to see how citizens 
with different religious, ethical, and philosophical views could maintain 
relations of equality and mutual respect. 
Perhaps tellingly, in a recent discussion of integralism, Adrian Vermeule
reports that one his colleagues, described as a “man of the left,” asked him 
the question: “[I]n a fully Catholic polity, the sort you would like to bring
about, what would happen to me, a Jew?”143  Vermeule’s response was: 
“Nothing bad, I assured him.”144  Vermeule does not say whether his colleague
was, in fact, reassured, but he should not have been.  For an integralist to
say that “nothing bad” will happen begs the question of what counts as 
good and bad.  An integralist might think that Pius IX’s taking of Mortara 
was a good thing and that the pope acted in the best interests of the child.  
But that view was, of course, no consolation to the child’s Jewish parents, 
and nor could it provide any reassurance to Vermeule’s Jewish colleague.
It might be a clever response, but it is not a serious one.  If integralists are
committed to their principles, that will entail real harms to the basic rights 
of religious minorities and to their equal standing in political society.  Bad 
things will happen to them, as they are happening in countries that are 
moving in the direction of ethnoreligious, and perhaps, integralist political 
regimes.145 
Here, an integralist might respond that it is necessary to draw a distinction 
between theory and practice, between integralism as an ideal and integralism 
as reflected in any actually existing political regime.146  But the distinction 
between theory and practice is not helpful to the integralist, because the harms 
at issue follow from the integralists’ conception of politics as warfare against 
theological enemies.  When, if ever, integralism is realized as a “very concrete 
142. See Leland, supra note 115; see also ANDREWLISTER,PUBLIC REASON AND POLITICAL
COMMUNITY 105–34 (2013). 
143. Vermeule, supra note 67. 
144. Id.
 145. See, e.g., Ira Forman, Viktor Orbán Is Exploiting Anti-Semitism, ATLANTIC (Dec.
14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/viktor-orban-and-anti-semitic- 
figyelo-cover/578158 [https://perma.cc/W722-ZCKF]; Henry Ridgwell, Rising Anti-Semitism 
Forces Jews to Question Future in Europe, VOICE AM. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.voa
news.com/europe/rising-anti-semitism-forces-jews-question-future-europe [https://perma.cc/
AUL7-B8BF]; Don Snyder, Anti-Semitism Spikes in Poland—Stoked by Populist Surge Against 
Refugees, FORWARD (Jan. 24, 2017), https://forward.com/news/world/360967/anti-semitism-
spikes-in-poland-stoked-by-populist-surge-against-refugees [https://perma.cc/YF76-ED4M] 
(discussing rise in Polish anti-Semitism). 
146. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 69 (distinguishing between “liberalism as a theory” 
and “liberalism as a regime”). 
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type of political-theological order,”147 it will be no surprise that religious
minorities are treated as enemies, that their rights are violated, and their 
status as equals is denied.  The theorist of integralism will have no standing 
to complain that the real has failed to track the ideal.  It will, in fact, have 
done so all too well. 
Lastly, the integralist’s rejection of society as a fair system of social
cooperation, and the refusal to recognize those of other faiths as free and
equal, is based on a more profound repudiation of the idea of reasonable
pluralism that characterizes modern liberal democratic societies. Unlike 
some mainstream religious conservatives, who recognize that such diversity 
is an ineliminable fact about American political culture—that it is that natural 
result of individuals reasoning under conditions of freedom—integralists 
harbor a nostalgia for a time when such pluralism was suppressed by the
pervasive influence of religious domination. Integralists are, of course, aware 
of this charge, and they deny it, arguing that it is, in fact, less radical religious
conservatives who are nostalgic for a time when there was a purported truce,
or at least less intense conflict, between Catholicism and liberalism.148 
For integralists, it is impossible that such a time could ever have existed. 
On their view, liberalism was born out of hostility to the Church, and it 
has always been in existential conflict.  But this response does not remove
the sting of the initial charge of nostalgia. It is no answer to say that others 
also hanker for a different, more idyllic time.  More importantly, the integralists’
vision is far more radical.  And if it is forward rather than backward looking, 
then it is subject to the charge of utopianism, or perhaps dystopianism, since
constraining pluralism to the extent necessary to establish an integralist
regime in Western liberal democratic societies would require massive levels
of state coercion.  Integralism’s eschatology—its theory of historical
development and the destiny of mankind—requires transcending the
conditions of modernity, which it sees as morally catastrophic.  No doctrine
that holds this view can be thought of as reasonable or within the moral 
boundaries of a liberal democratic political society.
Integralists will say that this fact, that liberals are intolerant of illiberal 
or antiliberal views, shows the incoherence of liberalism.  Liberals purport
to be value neutral and tolerant of others, when in fact they are neither. 
147. Id.
 148. See Vermeuele, supra note 76; see also BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED
REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 365–88 (2012) (defending 
against the charge of nostalgia for pre-Reformation Christendom). 
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This is an old argument and a tired one. No serious political liberal claims 
that liberalism is neutral across all values.  Every conception of liberalism 
contains normative commitments, both moral and epistemic values that 
are central to the theory and practice of liberal politics.  There is no internal
contradiction in recognizing those values and in defending them, as well 
as the institutions built upon them, from those who would tear them down.
But identifying some doctrines, and perhaps some citizens, as unreasonable
also does not signal intolerance or persecution.  A liberal society tolerates 
those who are unreasonable.149  It protects their rights in the same way that it
protects the rights of all others.  In a liberal society, people are free to convert 
to Catholicism, to become integralists, to espouse their views publicly, to 
associate with like-minded people, to raise their children to hold similar 
views, and so on. In fact, there is wide toleration of antiliberal views in 
liberal democratic states.  By contrast, toleration for liberal views could 
hardly be expected under an integralist regime, which would collapse the 
distinction between what is reasonable and what is tolerated.  Where all politics 
is theological and existential—a matter of warfare between friends and 
enemies—there is no space or luxury for such distinctions, whether in theory 
or in practice.
Integralists sometimes complain that political liberalism makes politics 
into meta-politics, using abstract concepts, such as reasonableness, to mask
its exclusionary and repressive internal logic.  In relaying the conversation 
with his Jewish colleague, Vermeule remarks, “This was no second-order 
discussion of ‘political liberty’ or ‘rights’ or ‘overlapping consensus.’
This was a passionate concrete question about the fate of an individual, a 
people, and the shape that a polity might take, all inseparably linked.  It
was, at last, after all the academic workshops on ‘procedural justice’ and
‘tolerance,’ a genuinely political conversation.”150  But to this objection, 
liberals can respond that the “Jewish question” will also be asked by other 
religious minorities and by nonbelievers.  In Western liberal democratic 
states, and no doubt others as well, citizens with a wide diversity of conceptions 
of the good will bring forward similar questions.  And the appropriate response 
is to articulate a set of values and principles at a level of generality that is 
responsive to such pluralism.  Integralists have no aversion or impatience 
with abstraction within their own accounts of politics.  The concept of the
political, the idea of representation, the Church as a complexio oppositorum, 
the integralist state as aiming toward a civitas humana or a societas perfecta, 
149. The issue of tolerating unreasonable citizens is discussed in the literature on political
liberalism.  See generally QUONG, supra note 13, at 290–315; Clayton & Stevens, supra 
note 16; Erin Kelly & Lionel McPherson, On Tolerating the Unreasonable, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 
38 (2001).
150. Vermeule, supra note 67. 
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the idea of natural law or the common good—all of these are meta-
political concepts, and yet integralists have no trouble invoking them.  The 
integralists’ impatience with abstract liberal concepts is about the substantive
content of those concepts and the motivation for adopting them, which is 
to respond in an equitable and tolerant way to the fact of reasonable pluralism.
The answer is not to go to war against that fact, but to learn how to live 
fairly and cooperatively—reasonably—with it. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In Political Liberalism, John Rawls remarked that a cause of the collapse
of liberal democracy in Weimar, Germany, was that the nation’s intellectual
elite “no longer believed a decent liberal parliamentary regime was 
possible.”151  Antiliberal critics had helped to discredit the project of liberal
democracy, which contributed to undermining the bonds of civic friendship 
and the stability of political institutions.
Today, “post-liberal,” antiliberal, and integralist opponents of liberal
democratic societies are engaged in similar attacks on the idea of liberal 
politics as a system of fair social cooperation among free and equal citizens.
In surveying the views of contemporary Catholic integralists, and at least
one important intellectual predecessor, we have focused on some of the
sharpest and most articulate expressions of this hostility to liberalism.  From 
within liberalism, integralism as a political doctrine is systematically 
unreasonable. That conclusion, of course, is expected within integralist 
thought, which sees liberalism as its political and theological nemesis. But, 
at least for those generally committed to the possibility of liberal democracy, 
it is nevertheless important to have a clear understanding of the basic 
moral and epistemic assumptions of political liberalism and why certain
doctrines, such as integralism, are in conflict with them.  Applying the liberal 
conception of reasonableness to the example of integralism helps to clarify
that conception and to identify and explain what is normatively objectionable
about such unreasonable views.
151. RAWLS, supra note 13, at lix.
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